Do Public R&D Subsidies Foster Innovation? : Evidence from Finnish Patent Data by Louhivuori, Valtter
Do Public R&D Subsidies Foster
Innovation?
Evidence from Finnish Patent Data
Valtter Juhana Louhivuori
University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Economics
Master’s thesis
October 2013
	  
 
 
Faculty 
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Department 
Department of Political and Economic Studies 
Author 
Valtter Juhana Louhivuori  
Title 
Do Public R&D Subsidies Foster Innovation? Evidence from Finnish Patent Data  
Subject 
Economics 
Level 
Master’s thesis  
Month and year 
October 2013  
Number of pages 
 62 + 2 
Abstract 
Innovations can be seen as an engine of long-term economic growth. Firms conduct research and development (R&D) activities to 
create new production technology, methods or products in order to rival their competitors. In addition to benefiting the inventor, 
new innovations have considerable positive externalities through knowledge spillovers. However, the socially optimal level of 
innovations may not be achieved, because firms can underinvest in R&D if they are not compensated for the positive externalities 
produced by their R&D activities. Public R&D programs aim to encourage innovation by compensating firms for the positive 
externalities that they produce. 
 
Finland’s recent public efforts on fostering innovation have been globally high by many indicators. Nevertheless, the effectiveness 
of these efforts has been relatively little scrutinised. This thesis studies the effectiveness of Finnish R&D program in fostering 
innovation outputs at the firm level. Firm-level patent statistics are used as a proxy for the innovativeness of a firm. 
 
A major contribution of this thesis is the comprehensive database that has been constructed and employed for the analysis. The 
database includes firm-level innovative characteristics for all the Finnish firms during a ten-year sample period, altogether covering 
more than two million observations for over 400 000 firms. 
 
Most of the studies on the effectiveness of the Finnish R&D program rely on the assumption that the researcher has full 
information on the relevant innovative characteristics that affect a firm’s program eligibility. This thesis addresses the program 
selectivity concern by employing an instrumental variable approach that exploits regional variation in public R&D funding stemming 
from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) aid regulations. 
 
The estimates suggest that when the program selection bias is neglected, program participation is associated with around 10 
percentage point increase in patenting probability among active patentees, whereas for all firms, the increase in patenting 
probability is only around 0.1 percentage points. However, the instrumental variable estimates do not confirm any significant causal 
effect of R&D program on patenting. 
 
This thesis highlights the importance of accounting for the selection bias induced by the R&D program selection criteria. The public 
R&D agency is found to select firms strongly based on the same characteristics that are highly associated with innovation within 
firms. Therfore, it is important to ask if some of the supported firms might have had conducted their R&D projects even in the 
absence of the public support. Analysing the R&D program’s selection criteria plays a major role in scrutinising the effectiveness of 
public R&D subsidies and in the further development of public innovation policies. 
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1 Introduction 1
1 Introduction
Modern economic growth is largely characterised by a country’s ability to create
new technological innovations (Kuznets, 1973). Private firms conduct research and
development (R&D) activities to create new production technology, methods or
products in order to rival their competitors. Major innovations induce considerable
positive externalities through knowledge spillovers. However, firms may end up
investing less to R&D activities than would be socially optimal, because they cannot
internalise the full benefits of their R&D investments.
Many industrial economies implement public R&D programs to encourage private
innovation. Public funding can bear a share of the financial risk associated with pri-
vate research activities and compensate firms for the positive externalities induced
by their research activities. The size of the public R&D program in Finland has
increased considerably during the past decades, and according to several indicators,
the Finnish R&D program is one of the most generous ones in the world (Eurostat,
2013; Tekes, 2012a). However, it remains somewhat unclear whether the Finnish
R&D program has in fact fostered new innovations. This thesis studies the effec-
tiveness of Finnish R&D program in encouraging private innovation. This thesis
complements existing studies, which have mostly concentrated on assessing the in-
novative efforts of the subsidised firms, whereas the achievements of these efforts
have been relatively little scrutinised. I construct a comprehensive database that
covers firm-level patent statistics for all Finnish firms during a ten year sample pe-
riod, and deploy the data to assess the effectiveness of the Finnish R&D subsidy
program.
Most of the studies on the effectiveness of the Finnish R&D subsidy scheme are based
on estimates of average program effects, which neglect the fact that the firms eligible
for support may differ from firms in the comparison group. Matching methods are
also likely to produce biased estimates, because a researcher is unlikely to observe
all the characteristics highlighted in the R&D program selection criteria, which will
lead to violation of conditional independence assumption. This thesis addresses the
concern of endogenous support by employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach
that exploits regional variation in public R&D funding stemming from the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) aid regulations.
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My findings indicate that when the possible program selection bias is neglected,
the public R&D program participation is associated with a small increase in the
probability to file a patent application over the five years following the program ap-
proval decision. The program participation is associated with around 10 percentage
point increase in the patenting probability among active patentees, whereas for all
firms, the increase in patenting probability is only around 0.1 percentage points. On
the other hand, although the ERDF aid regulations produce significant variation to
program participation probability, the IV estimates do not confirm any significant
causal effect of R&D program on patenting.
This thesis provides a set of new contributions to the Finnish R&D discussion. To
my best knowledge, the dataset is more extensive than the ones used in any of
the previous studies on Finnish innovation. The constructed database allows the
researcher to use a multitude of firm characteristics to delimit the target group of
interest from the full firm population, in contrast to survey samples where only
respondents are represented. Secondly, this thesis is the first in Finland to study
the patents produced by the publicly supported R&D projects using IV methods.
Thirdly, I will employ some fairly little used non-linear IV methods and assess the
robustness of these methods compared to simple linear models.
The thesis is organised as follows. Section 2 first introduces the different indicators
of innovation and then concentrates on discussing patent statistics. The section will
also provide the economic justification for public R&D programs and review the
previous literature on the effects of public R&D on innovation. Section 3 introduces
the institutional setting of Finnish R&D policies and describe recent patenting trends
in Finland. Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 outlines the empirical
approach. Section 6 reports and discusses the main results and performs several
robustness tests. Finally, section 7 presents the conclusions of the study.
2 Background
The definition of “innovation” in this study simply stands for “a new method, idea,
product, etc.” as described in Oxford English Dictionary1. The existing research has
1“innovation, n” OED Online. Oxford University Press. http://dictionary.oed.com. (Accessed 15
May 2013).
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used several competing indicators of innovation, all which have their pros and cons.
The following section presents the different indicators of innovations and introduce
patents more thoroughly. The section will also explain the economic justification
for public research and development (R&D) programs and briefly cover existing
literature on R&D subsidies and innovation.
2.1 Measuring Innovations
The research on innovations heavily originates from the early neo-classical attempts
to explain the driving forces of economic growth. In the beginning, innovations were
modeled simply as an exogenous phenomenon, which moved according to its own
laws (e.g. Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). Gradually, the innovation process itself
begun to attract interest, and growth models were appended with micro-components
aiming to explain the process of technological change itself (e.g. Arrow, 1962; Shell,
1966; Uzawa, 1965 and Romer, 1990). In order to test these theories, quantitative
researchers had to develop indicators that would measure the abstract concept of
innovation more concretely. Popular candidates included R&D expenditures and the
number of employees working in R&D. Both indicators intend to capture the effort
that firms are putting in generating new inventions, and can therefore be understood
as inputs for innovation process. However, not all R&D projects are successful in
creating new technology or discovering improved production methods. Therefore,
one would need indicators for the inventive output of the R&D process to assess the
actual increase in the knowledge stock, i.e. the change in the contemporary level of
technology.
Patent data, in economic research, is mainly used as an indicator of increase in
economically valuable knowledge stock. Patent data provides a glimpse at the over-
all innovative activeness in certain region, sector or company. The recorded patent
statistics stretch back to late 19th century, which is one of the factors that commend
the use of patents as a longitudinal indicator of technological change. Schmookler
(1951) and Schmookler (1952) were probably the first studies that published numer-
ical values on total factor productivity and related them to patent counts. Later
works of Schmookler (1966) and Scherer (1965), concentrated on assessing the rela-
tion between R&D and patent statistics, employing patent statistics as an indicator
of the innovation process output; instead of using it as a proxy for general level of
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technology. Several later studies (e.g. Hausmann et al., 1984; Bound et al., 1984;
and Scherer, 1983) have continued to study the relationship of R&D and patents
to further validate patents as an economic indicator suitable for scrutinising inno-
vation policies. A major conclusion, made by Pakes and Griliches (1984), was that
there exists a strong relationship between R&D and patents in cross sectional stud-
ies across industries and firms. The median R-square was around 0.9, which further
increased the interest in patents as an indicator of inventive outputs.
The quality of patent data has continued to improve over time, when patent offices
have increased the information reported in patent applications. From the economic
point of view, the value of patent data comes from the ability to link the data
to other variables of interest, and for a long time, the limited dimensions of the
data hindered the full-scale benefits (Hall et al., 2005). Schmookler (1966) and
Griliches (1984) assigned patent counts to industries and created a concordance be-
tween patent statistics and selected firm characteristics. Scherer (1982) prefaced
classifications of patent industry of origin and industries of use. Hall et al. (2005)
constructed an U.S. patent dataset that reported not only all citations made by a
single patent, but also all citations that the same patent received. The constructed
database allowed later researchers to weight U.S. patents by their importance on
other patents (i.e. citation weighted patents), and therefore, address the underlying
heterogeneity in the value of different patents. Despite the importance of citation
weighted patent counts in economic research, simple patent counts are still com-
monly used when analysing topical policy changes, because of the problems related
with data truncation of newer patents 2.
A benefit of modern patent data is that it is widely available and provides a wealth
of information on the applicants and the technology that has been patented. In
addition, patents describe the outputs of inventive process unlike many of its candi-
date indicators. However, patents, as well as all the other indicators of innovation,
are imperfect. A major shortcoming of patent data is that not all inventions are
patentable, nor do firm want to patent all inventions. Since the information con-
tained in patent applications becomes publicly available after the patent is granted,
some inventors assign high value on secrecy and choose not to patent. The patents
2One has to allow sufficient time for new patents to receive citations before they are truly compa-
rable with older patents. For this reason, I cannot use citation weighted patent in this thesis.
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are also costly3, and therefore not all minor inventions are patented. On the other
hand, a high price of patents can also act as a positive factor if one wants to con-
centrate only on major innovations. An additional downside of patent data is that
firm-level patent numbers can be rather low. Therefore, the discrete nature of the
data may induce some technical complications to statistical analysis, which may
require non-linear models to accommodate to the distributional peculiarities.
2.2 Describing Patents
A patent is a nationwide entitlement for an inventor to exclude others from pro-
ducing, using, selling, or importing an invention for a limited period of time. The
purpose of patents, from government’s point of view, is to provide an innovator a
possibility to recover innovation costs in exchange for revealing the idea to the pub-
lic. After a patent has been granted, the information it consists becomes publicly
available, and other companies can build new inventions on the existing knowledge4.
An invention eligible for patent protection has to be novel, non-obvious, and have
an industrial application (OECD, 2004). Therefore, a patent can be granted only
to concrete technical solutions, which differ essentially from previously known tech-
nologies (ibid.). Every patent application is reviewed by a specialist in the field in
order to ensure that the application adheres to these requirements. A patent is a
temporary right, which is valid for a limited period of time, generally 20 years from
filing the application, after which the invention becomes into the public domain.
This thesis studies Finnish patents, which makes it essential to carefully define the
nationality of an invention. A patent provides territorial rights restricted only to
the country where they have been granted. Currently, there exists no ‘international
patents’, and an inventor has to seek for international protection by filing a selected
bundle of national patents. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Policy, provides the basic principles for international patenting such as unique treat-
ment across member countries5. When an inventor files the first application for a
patent (i.e. a priority patent) in a country that adheres to the principles Paris
Convention, the inventor is allowed a grace period of one year to make decisions
3In 2004, an estimated cost of Euro-patent was around EUR 30 500 (Berger, 2005).
4The right for the invention is restricted to the owner of the patent, but the information within
a patent application is published.
5See WIPO, Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property article 2 and 4
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whether international protection is to be pursued. International protection will be
sought by filing individual patent applications to the patent offices in the countries
of interest. Therefore all patent applications are not ’new’ patents, since they can
be extensions to the original priority patents. In addition, a patent filed in Finland
does not necessarily mean that the invention or the inventor is Finnish. The inventor
(normally a private person) and the applicant (normally an organisation or a firm)
of a patent may have different nationalities, which makes the nationality of a patent
rather ambiguous. A common practice in patent literature (e.g. OECD, 2009) is
to use the nationality of an inventor to define the nationality of a patent. Whereas
in country-level analysis this approach works well, it becomes more cumbersome in
firm-level analysis, because in order to link the national patents to a corresponding
firm data, one has to make some further assumptions on the nationality of the firm
as well. These assumptions made in this thesis are covered in section 4.
2.3 Economic Justification for R&D Programs
Public R&D programs are widely used across industrialised countries to support
innovative activities. The main economic justification for R&D subsidies is that
competitive markets alone may not be able to achieve the optimal resource allocation
(Nelson, 1959). Socially optimal level of innovation is higher than can be achieved in
the competitive markets, because the firms are not be compensated for the positive
externalities created by their innovations. In other words, private enterprises cannot
claim the full price for the benefits that that their innovations produce. Another
cause of market failure relates to the uncertain nature of R&D activities. In the
beginning of an R&D project, it is often unclear if the project will be successful.
The final costs of an R&D project and the commercial value of the potential output
are also hard to estimate, especially if the output is truly novel and there is no
guarantee on the market demand for it. In addition, the instruments to shift risks
are often imperfect and limited. Therefore, it is likely that risk averse investors
would underinvest in research activities. Einiö (2010) also notes that technically
complicated projects can lead to information asymmetries between the investors
and inventors, which can further decrease financiers’ interest in financing R&D.
Arrow (1962) offers an additional explanation for market failure with regards to
innovations: indivisibilities. The essential value of R&D activities relate to the pro-
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duction of new information. A piece of information is by definition an indivisible
commodity that can be hard to price. In competitive markets, information should
be transmitted at a marginal cost, but because the cost of trading information is
practically zero, the optimal allocation would demand for unlimited, free distribu-
tion of information. Therefore, an inventor would have no incentive to conduct any
R&D activities, because there would be no compensation for the R&D costs. Le-
gal protection can provide some monopolistic power for the inventor, which would
allow one to extract revenues for the innovation. However, it is extremely difficult
(or impossible) to provide full legal protection for such an abstract commodity as
information.
Public R&D subsidies may help overcome some of the limitation faced by competitive
markets. Government subsidies encourage firms to engage in innovative activities
that would not be otherwise economically feasible. Subsidies can reduce the risks
faced by firms due to uncertainties in innovative processes and also compensate
firms for the social benefits of the invention, which they could not internalise in
competitive markets. In addition, government agencies may have wider experience
and technical expertise in evaluating project proposals than many private financiers
(Einiö, 2010). Therefore, public financing can provide an important indicator for
private investors on the value of the project, which can help reduce information
asymmetries.
Although government R&D programs can theoretically have an important role in
encouraging private innovation, the effectiveness of the programs depend much on
the allocation of public R&D financing. Public R&D support should be allocated
to projects with high positive externalities, if the project would not be otherwise
economically feasible. However, R&D programs may value the projects based on
the expectation of commercial success (e.g. Wallsten, 2000; Einiö, forthcoming)
despite the fact that these projects are the most likely to be privately profitable, and
therefore, profit-seeking firms might engage in the R&D activities even in the absence
of public support. Because every firm has an incentive to apply for additional
public financing, the selection criteria for the public support play an important role.
When government agencies are not able to effectively exclude projects that would
be privately profitable, the public support may turn out to have only a marginal
additional role in fostering innovation.
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2.4 Studies on Innovation
There is a risk that public support substitutes private funding instead of increasing
the total level of R&D efforts. The research on the effectiveness of public R&D
has been increasing, but it remains quite controversial. The empirical methods also
differ widely, and to date, there has been only a few studies that concentrate on
providing evidence of causality. A common tendency in recent literature has been
to employ matching and propensity score (or both) estimators to firm-level R&D
data based on innovation surveys, such as European Community Innovation Survey
(CIS), Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and Survey on Firm Strategies (see e.g.
Hall, 2005; Duguet, 2004 and Czarnitski et al., 2007).
The research on the effectiveness of public R&D programs has largely concentrated
in assessing how public support affects private R&D efforts. David et al. (2000) pro-
vides an extensive review of the empirical evidence from the past 35 years and con-
cluded that one-third of the analysed studies reported a crowding-out effect between
public and private R&D. Hall (2005) reports that full crowding-out effect is found
only in studies employing US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) sample,
whereas other international studies report positive effects on subsidies. Gonzalés et
al. (2005) use a panel data of 145 Spanish firms, and find no direct substitution
effect between subsidies and private spending, although it is argued that most of
the subsidies were allocated to firms that would have engaged in R&D activities in
any case. González and Pazó (2008) extend the sample to cover 2214 spanish firm
and report no crowding-out effect, although public subsidies were found to stimulate
private R&D only marginally in firms that would have performed R&D activities
anyway. Czarnitski et al. (2007) evaluate the effect for Finnish and German firms,
Duguet (2004) performs similar matching analysis in French context and Czarnitski
and Hussinger (2004) evaluates the effects of public R&D in Germany. All of these
studies based on matching methods rejected a complete crowding-out effect of public
subsidies.
Wallsten (2000) assess the question with SBIR sample using IV methods to control
for endogenous treatment decision. The study employs across-industry-variation in
public funding to instrument for endogenous R&D funding and concludes that SBIR
program fully crowds out private R&D investments within subsidised firms. Einiö
(forthcoming) questions the exogeneity of Wallsten’s (2000) instrument and utilises
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an instrument based on regional variation in European Union Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) support. The study concludes that an additional subsidy euro will
foster 1.2 euros of additional R&D spending during the first full year of R&D scheme
participation. In addition to Einiö (ibid), there has been only a limited number of
studies on the effectiveness of Finnish R&D scheme. The R&D agency’s own reports
rely on average results among the program participants, while completely neglecting
the differences across firms. Ali-Yrkkö (2005) analyses a dataset of 441 Finnish
firms during 1996-2002 and estimates the effect of public R&D financing on private
R&D using Wallsten’s (2000) instrument. The study finds a small but significant
additional effect of public financing (elasticity around 0.01). Toivanen and Niininen
(2000) report a negative elasticity (-0.1) between public R&D and private R&D for
large firms, whereas no significant effect was found for small firms.
Most of the above evidence suggests that public R&D support is associated with an
increase in firm-level R&D efforts. In order to assess how public R&D affects innova-
tive outputs, one has to study the link between R&D inputs and innovative outputs.
Several studies, such as Griliches (1984); Hall et al. (1986); Meliciani (2000) and
Bottazzi and Peri (2003), have empirically analysed the R&D-patent relationship.
Although there seems to be a general consensus that R&D and patents are related,
the strength of this link remains ambiguous. A seminal study by Griliches (1984)
analysed 121 U.S. manufacturing firms and found out that in 25 per cent of the
within variation in patenting was related to the variance in R&D expenditure. Hall
et al. (1986) highlight econometric problems associated with the discreteness of the
patent outcome variable and employ a series of non-linear least squares and Poisson-
type models. They confirm a positive and significant effect of R&D on patenting
(elasticity around 0.3). Meliciani (2000) tests Poisson and negative binomial models
and reports a weakly positive relationship between R&D expenditures. Bottazzi
and Peri (2003) analyse the R&D-patent relationship utilising regional long-run (27
years) averages in R&D expenditures and patents. They find that, at an aggregate
level, one per cent increase in regional R&D expenditures is associated with an in-
crease in local patenting of around 0.8 per cent. To my best knowledge, Czarnitski et
al. (2007) is the only study that has discussed the effect of public R&D on Finnish
patenting. The study estimates the effect of public R&D programs on patenting
in both Finland (1520 firms) and Germany (1464 firms). The matching-estimate
for Finland indicates that firms that received public R&D support are 10% more
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likely to file a patent application than the unsubsidised firms. However, it should be
noted that the matching estimate corresponds to the true causal effect of the R&D
program only if a researcher has all the relevant information that affect the R&D
granting decision (i.e. the conditional independence assumption would hold)6.
3 Finnish Institutional Setting
Finnish innovation policy provides a particularly good framework for assessing the
effects of public subsidies on private innovation for two reasons. First, public R&D
funding in Finland contributes significantly to private research activities. Currently,
around 30% of R&D expenditures come from government budget7. Second, pub-
lic funding for supporting private R&D activities is centralised to the Funding
Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes). Therefore, all public R&D grants
are awarded by Tekes and the selection criteria to public R&D programs is therefore
unique among all applicants in the country, in comparison to many countries where
several public agencies may provide earmarked R&D support with differing selection
criteria. This section will elaborate the main features of the Finnish R&D subsidy
scheme and the policies on European Union Regional Development Fund aid. The
section will also describe recent patenting trends in Finland.
3.1 Finnish R&D Subsidy Scheme
R&D intensity8 in Finland is among the highest in the world. Figure 1 shows that
the general international trend of total R&D intensity has been increasing during
the past decade and that Finland compares relatively high to other top countries.
The considerable increase in the end reflects for the higher government R&D budget
allocation in 20089.
Public R&D investments have also been high, and the share of public R&D spending
of the total government expenditures have been around two per cent during the past
decade (Eurostat, 2013). Practically all public funding to private R&D is centralised
6The credibility of this assumption will be further discussed in section 5.
7http://www.tekes.fi (Accessed 14 April 2013).
8R&D expenditures to GDP
9The increase in Finnish R&D share during 2009 is mainly due to the decrease in GDP.
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to the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes), and the
volume of financing amounted to EUR 570 million last year (Tekes, 2012a).
Figure 1: R&D expenditures to GDP
Tekes selects the firms eligible for funding by using a set of selection criteria, which
include both qualitative and quantitative indicators. According to the agency’s
internet pages, the selection criteria emphasize the project’s commercial potential,
novelty value, technical challenges and available financial and human resources10.
In addition, the longer the period before the expected commercialization, the larger
an investment Tekes may provide.
To receive support, the applicants also need to provide evidence for their ability
to cover the deductible share of financing, which varies between 50 to 75 per cent
of the total project cost (Tekes, 2012a). Most of the Finnish innovation funding
is allocated to firms with less than 500 employees, which receive around 70 to 75
percent of total funding. Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) receive around
50 to 60 per cent of the total Finnish innovation funding and the remaining share is
granted to large companies (ibid.). Projects in large companies are generally more
10http://www.tekes.fi (accessed 02 April 2013).
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costly, and therefore, these projects are expected to induce significant national and
international externalities11. There is also considerable variation in subsidies be-
tween industries as can be seen in figure 2. Manufacturing industry and business
activities12 receive a major share of the total R&D subsidies. The mean disburse-
ments are also relatively high within these industries. The subsidy flows in these
industries have been relatively stable, with an exception of year 2008, which was
also visible in figure 1.
The effectiveness of the scheme depends much on Tekes’ ability to select projects that
would not be realised with private financing. The agency’s own research finds that
more than 80 per cent of the funded projects reported Tekes’ support as significant
(Tekes, 2012b). However, it is possible that the R&D program participants inflate
the benefits of Tekes financing in fear of losing future support (Einiö, forthcoming).
It is also important to recognise the fact that the agency’s own reports are invariably
based on average effects that do not account for selection bias. In order to estimate
the true causal effect of the R&D subsidy scheme, one must account for possible bias
stemming from the fact that the program participants are not randomly selected. I
will address the selection bias by employing an IV-setup introduced by Einiö (ibid),
which exploits regional variation in R&D subsidies induced by EU’s regional policies.
11http://www.tekes.fi (accessed 16 March 2013).
12More specifically, this industry comprises of real estate, renting and business activities
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Figure 2: Total and mean subsidies by industry
3.2 Regional Variation in R&D Subsidies
European Union Regional Development Fund (ERDF) aims to support rural regions
from lagging behind in economic development and to improve regional cohesion by
providing higher funding for sparsely populated regions. The ERDF aid for Finland
3 Finnish Institutional Setting 14
was agreed on in 1994 when Finland became an EU member, and Finland managed
to negotiate highest level of aid for a large part of Eastern and Northern Finland.
The ERDF aid is allocated based on the population densities within regions de-
fined in European Union Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS).
The criteria for the highest level of ERDF aid (hereafter ERDF1) is that the NUTS2
(suuralue) population density in 1992 should not exceed 8 persons per square kilome-
ter13. However, before the agreement on ERDF aid for Finland was ratified, further
changes were made with regards to the regions eligible for the highest level of aid.
NUTS2 areas in Finland are generally larger than in EU on average, and there-
fore, some additional smaller NUTS4 (seutukunta) regions were approved eligible
for ERDF1 aid. Figure 3 shows ERDF1 regions during program period 2000-200614.
During the currently on-going period 2007-2013, Finland no longer satisfies the cri-
teria of the previous ERDF program. The ERDF and NUTS structure was modified
so that ERDF aid allocation became based on NUTS3 (maakunta) regions (see figure
3).
The regional programs are jointly financed by public sector and the ERDF. In the
current program, Eastern and Northern Finland receive the largest shares of ERDF
financing, with respective shares of 37.6 per cent (EUR 366 million) and 31.9 per
cent (EUR 311 million)15. In all of the regional programs, the innovation support
components are considerable: 69 per cent in Eastern Finland and 59 per cent in
Northern Finland of the total ERDF financing (Laakso and Kilpeläinen, 2010).
13See Protocol 6 in the EU Act of Accession of 1994
14The regions were ratified in ’Objective 6’ program during 1995-1999. For program period
2000-2006 the name was changed to ’Objective 1’, but the ERDF1 regions were largely main-
tained. During 2007-2013 program period, the name was once again changed to “Convergence
objective”.
15Calculations based on data from http://www.rakennerahastot.fi (accessed 4 April 2013).
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Figure 3: Areas eligible for the highest level of ERDF aid during program periods
2000-2006 and 2007-2013
The regional variation in R&D program subsidies stem from the fact that Tekes
is allowed to withdraw larger amounts of ERDF funding for projects in the areas
eligible for the highest level of regional aid. For example, during program period
2000-2006 ERDF’s share of financing for regional innovative measures was entitled to
amount up to 50 per cent in areas outside the ERDF1 region, whereas the threshold
for the ERDF1 regions was as high as 80 per cent of the total financing16. The
16See Communication 2001/60 from the Commission to the European Council [COM(2001/60].
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ERDF aid regulations can therefore provide considerable regional variation in the
probability of a projects to become accepted into the public R&D program. For
example, during 2000-2005 the average share of ERDF financing in granted Tekes
subsidies was 28.4 per cent in ERDF1 region, whereas in other regions in Finland
the share was only some 0.8 per cent (Einiö, forthcoming). Therefore, two identical
firms on different sides of ERDF1 borders are likely to differ in the probability to
become accepted into the R&D subsidy program, which can be exploited in effort
to tackle with the selection bias created by Tekes’ selection criteria.
3.3 Patenting in Finland
The surge in Finnish innovation has been a fairly recent phenomenon, and the num-
ber of patent applications were at very low levels during the first half of the 20th
century. Until the end of second world war, Finnish manufacturing industry was
largely based on the abundant raw wood material used in paper industry. Local
innovation activity was low, since the technological development in the paper indus-
try was largely based on imported technological solutions (Nikulainen, 2008). After
the second world war, Finnish manufacturing industry begun to invest in upgrading
imported technology. Development of the new technology was largely concentrated
in few large manufacturing companies, such as Valmet, Ahlström, Wärtsilä and
Outokumpu (ibid). The knowledge base created during the following thirty years
facilitated Finland’s progress towards to knowledge-driven economy17, which truly
took off during the late eighties. The new era was characterised by the rise of ICT
industry, increased investments in R&D and a surge in patenting activity, as shown
in figure 418.
17See Dahlman et al. (2006) for a thorough historic overview on Finland’s shift from resource-
driven economy to knowledge-based production.
18The estimated number of Finnish patents is higher than the corresponding estimates of Statistics
Finland (www.stat.fi) because figure (4) accounts for all Finnish inventions (patents, which
were invented by a finn), not only the applications filed to the National Board of Patents and
Registration of Finland. See section 4 for the exact definition of Finnish invention used in this
thesis.
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Figure 4: Annual Finnish patent applications
Source: OECD Patstat, author’s own calculations
Since the late eighties, the number of Finnish patents have nearly doubled, and
currently, Finland ranks as one of the top countries in terms of patents applications
per capita (OECD, 2010).
Figure 5 describes the composition of Finnish patent applications by patent classes.
The large changes in the relative shares of different patent classes in the early 20th
century is due to the small total number of patent applications (compare to figure
4). Figure 5 illustrates how the relative share of patents in the field of ’mechani-
cal engineering’ and ’performing operations and transporting’ have reduced during
the past two decades and become dominated by patents in the field of ’electricity’
(mostly in the field of ICT technology).
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Figure 5: Annual patents by patent class
The patent classifications give some insight to the type of technologies invented in
Finland. However, since one patent application can be simultaneously classified into
several patent classes, one cannot fully determine the industrial composition on the
basis of these classifications. The differences across industries in their patenting
activity becomes highlighted when the patents are linked to the applicant’s industry
of origin, as can be seen from figure 619.
19The industries are based on firm-level statistics from YRTTI database (described in section 4),
which I have for the sample period 2000-2009.
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Figure 6: Annual Patents by the Industry of Origin
In the beginning of the last decade, manufacturing industry filed over 80 per cent of
all Finnish patent applications, and the share increased to over 90 per cent during
the second half. Manufacturing industry is followed by “real estate, renting and
business activities”, in which the majority of patents come from research and business
services. The number of firms in the remaining industries account for 65 per cent
of the sample, but they are responsible for only around five percent of all patent
applications.
The manufacturing industry comprises of heterogenous group of firms with prod-
ucts varying from jewellery to heavy machinery and electrical equipment. Figure
7 provides further insight into the innovation activities within the manufacturing
industry.
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Figure 7: Annual patents within the manufacturing industry
The 16 industries presented in the figure 6 are divided into a less aggregated level
of 82 industries, of which only the sub-industries under the manufacturing industry
have been reported in figure 7.
A large majority of the patenting firms are within the electronics industry and of-
fice and electrical equipment industry, which are followed by machinery. The large
increase in the relative share of patents in electronics industry in 2002 relates to
a change in the industry classification, which shifted Nokia Oyj from the office
and electrical equipment industry to electronics industry. The increase in the rel-
ative share of office and electrical equipment industry during the last three years
is mainly due to a rapid increase in the patenting activity of Nokia Siemens Net-
works Oy, which filed a total of 502 applications in 2008, while patenting in Nokia
Oyj remained about the same as in year 2006 (740). Besides Nokia Oyj and Nokia
Siemens Networks Oy, Metsopaper Oy was the only firm that had over 100 annual
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patents20 during the ten-year sample.
Figure 8: Annual patents within the manufacturing industry (largest firms excluded)
Generally, Finnish patent applications are largely dominated by a few manufacturing
firms, including Kone, Outokumpu and ABB together with the three previously
mentioned firms. For instance, during the sample period, Nokia Oyj alone accounts
for more than 20 percent of the total patent applications in Finland and nearly
99 percent of patent applications within the electricity industry. When the largest
firms21 are excluded, the industrial distribution of patent applications drastically
changes as seen in figure 8. The annual variation across industries becomes larger
and the firms most active in patenting are found within machinery (a total of 349
patents), followed by ’medical, testing and optical equipment’ (178 patents) and
’pulp paper and paperboard’ (117 patents) industries. After the largest firms are
excluded, the patenting firms annually file some 11 patents on average, although
a large majority of the firms have not filed a single patent application during the
20Metsopaper Oy had over 100 patents during all the 10 years in the sample. The number of
patent applications ranged from 122 in 2005 to 168 in 2006.
21See section 4 for further details on the sample restriction.
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entire sample, which highlights the considerable difference in the patenting activity
across firms.
4 Data
I have constructed an extensive administrative database on Finnish firm-level patent
statistics for this thesis. The data includes several administrative datasets, which
have been linked together with innovation data to form a dataset of 2 244 823 obser-
vations for 425 476 Finnish firms during a ten year period from 2000 to 2009. The
sample period provides an excellent glance at Finnish innovation, because patenting
activeness was exceptionally high during the period. Around 20 000 patent applica-
tions were filed during the sample period, which accounts for nearly half of the total
Finnish patent applications ever applied22.
I begin by setting up a patent database, which includes only patents relevant for
innovation in Finnish firms. Research based on raw patent statistics always requires
substantial amount of data processing due to large data volumes and equivocality on
defining patents. As far as possible, I have followed the general consensus23 across
literature on defining relevant patents for creating a proxy of innovation on national
level. The raw patent data is drawn from European Patent Office Worldwide Patent
Statistics Database, commonly known as EPO PATSTAT24, which is an extensive
source of patent statistics25 with a worldwide coverage. The data is intended for
statistical research purposes for both research institutes and EPO’s own patent
officers. I set up a patent database based on EPO’s data and use further filtering
to select relevant Finnish patent applications. First, I aim to capture only new
inventions by filtering out patent applications that claim a priority right for an
existing patent. Following patent literature, I use application dates of the first filing
for a patent instead of granting dates or general filing dates. First filing dates are
recommended against general filing dates, which may include amendments to already
existing patents. Second, I include only local and international patent applications,
while excluding other applications, inter alia, for utility models.
22Around 42 000 Finnish patents have been filed since the early 20th century.
23For an extensive summary, see OECD (2009).
24April 2012 version.
25The database provides a total of 61 variables that can be used to filter relevant patents.
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Most of the ambiguity relates to the defining the Finnish patents. Generally, the
origin of a patents is recommended (see OECD, 2009) to be based on the nationality
of the inventor, rather than on the applicant’s nationality. However, an application
can have several inventors from different nationalities and the firm that applies
for the patent may not be from Finland, even if the inventors would be Finnish.
Therefore, some of the patents based purely on the inventors nationality would be
impossible to link to Finnish firm databases. Therefore, I define Finnish inventions
as applications filed by a Finnish person or entity with at least one Finnish inventor.
Requiring that the applicant is from Finland ensures that the patenting firms can be
linked to Finnish firm-registers, while the requirement of Finnish inventor is applied
in order to exclude most of the research projects, which are fully conducted abroad
by Finnish firms with foreign staff 26. Since my study concentrates on firms, I exclude
private inventors, defined as applicants who have the same name as the inventor27.
Finally, I exclude research institutes and match the created patent database to
firm-level data drawn from YRTTI database28 (see Appendix 1 for an explanation
on how the matching was conducted).
National Board of Taxes maintains YRTTI database, which provides administrative
data on firm tax and financial balances. The database covers the full Finnish firm
population and provides all the annual information contained in the firms’ manda-
tory tax returns. Linking patent database to YRTTI is a cumbersome process,
because PATSTAT does not account business ID numbers for patents. Therefore
the two large databases has to be matched by using string matching algorithms.
However, once the matching has been once done, it has significant academic value,
because it allows future researchers to numerically link patent statistics to practically
all contemporary Finnish firm databases simply based on the business ID numbers. I
further augment the dataset with R&D subsidy data requested from Tekes for years
2000 to 2009. Since Tekes is the only authority providing public R&D subsidies
to Finnish firms, the dataset includes all public R&D subsidy payments made in
Finland during the sample period. Finally, I will complete the dataset by including
additional municipal characteristics provided by Statistics Finland and the Associ-
ation of Finnish and Regional Authorities. To my best knowledge, the completed
26These projects would not be eligible for Finnish R&D support.
27Firms, entities and private persons can be marked as an applicant, whereas the reported inventor
is always a private person.
28Overall, I am able to match 20 536 patents to 4 465 Finnish firms.
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database is up to date the most comprehensive database on firm-level innovation in
Finland.
I draw a sample from the database, which excludes firms that can be regarded un-
representative for the target population of this study (innovating firms). First, I will
exclude private entrepreneurs, because they are unlikely to conduct any patentable
R&D efforts nor do they receive public R&D subsidies to a large extent. In addi-
tion, the tax reporting liabilities of private entrepreneurs differ substantially from
those for firms, which would restrict the number of available firm-control variables.
Second, I remove shell companies, which I have defined as companies that have not
had any financial activity during the whole sample period. Third, I exclude sec-
tors29 where innovation activity is low (less than 50 patents during the sample)30.
These sectors include e.g. fishing industry, public administration and arts, enter-
tainment and recreational activities. Finally, I restrict the sample to cover only for
firms with more than five and less than 500 employees. The smallest companies are
excluded because their average R&D activity is very low. Excluding small firms also
reduces the noise of the data considerably, because a large share of Finnish small,
non-innovating firms belong to group. Largest firms are excluded because most of
the R&D subsidies are paid to firms below 500 employees (see section 3.1). Large
firms may also have several affiliated companies, which makes it difficult to link the
patents to correct subsidiaries. In addition, few high patentees, such as Nokia Oyj
and Kone Oyj, hardly represent average Finnish firms. High number of patents in
these firms create a very long right tail to the Finnish patent distribution, which
can bias the estimates for patent counts. After these modifications, the final sample
consists of 605 427 observations for 88 992 firms.
Table 1 on the next page provides descriptive statistics for the analysis sample.
29The sectors are based on 2-digit NACE classification.
30Sectors with the high levels of patenting, will be also separately analysed in section 6.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
All Controls Treated ERDF 0, 2 and 4 ERDF 1
1(R&D programt) Mean .0039955 0 1 .004162 .0030671
Std. Deviation .0630838 0 0 .0643795 .0552967
Min 0 0 1 0 0
Max 1 0 1 1 1
Observations 605427 603008 2419 516093 87705
Patentst Mean .0249625 .0235735 .3712278 .0289037 .0022348
Std. Deviation 3.442011 3.38573 10.37128 3.72782 .0925705
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 926 926 502 926 11
Observations 605427 603008 2419 516093 87705
1(Patentst+1-t+5) Mean .0050256 .0045374 .1148289 .0054947 .0026147
Std. Deviation .070713 .0672071 .3189366 .0739223 .0510673
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 1
Observations 297081 295766 1315 248786 48190
1(Patented Before 
Year 2000)
Mean .0081794 .0077926 .1045887 .0085798 .0059176
Std. Deviation .0900692 .0879312 .306086 .0922293 .0766982
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 1
Observations 605427 603008 2419 516093 87705
Revenuet-1 Mean 4932.67 4836.909 28800 5437.542 1955.992
Std. Deviation 121000 121000 144000 131000 17200
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 32200000 32200000 3930000 32200000 2200000
Observations 483328 481400 1928 412260 69832
Salest-1 Mean 5456.518 5348.545 32300 6033.473 2061.985
Std. Deviation 132000 132000 154000 143000 17700
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 37500000 37500000 4020000 37500000 2200000
Observations 474213 472311 1902 404421 68567
Employmentt-1 Mean 29.6726 29.11206 169.6328 31.46006 19.2509
Std. Deviation 243.221 234.5608 1035.94 261.6923 70.58258
Min 1 1 1 1 1
Max 34517 34517 33077 34517 4154
Observations 483328 481400 1928 412260 69832
Notes: The sample contains 605 427 observations from 88992 firms. All monetary terms are expressed in thousand euros and countable 
variables in single units. Startup defines firms that are no more than three years old. Population density is based on NUTS4 classification.
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Table 1: Continued
All Controls Treated ERDF 0, 2 and 4 ERDF 1
Average Waget-1 Mean 20.06262 20.05269 22.54158 21.31746 12.49981
Std. Deviation 1285.121 1287.691 28.06337 1391.406 35.662
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 500000 500000 1000 500000 8800
Observations 483328 481400 1928 412260 69832
Fixed Assets per 
Employeet-1
Mean 15.11548 15.10874 16.7556 15.77333 10.9499
Std. Deviation 1693.391 1696.848 119.6487 1833.86 130.1056
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1050000 1050000 4285.715 1050000 23300
Observations 455259 453397 1862 387808 66264
Startupt-1 Mean .109052 .1085558 .2327408 .1092923 .1040648
Std. Deviation .3117047 .3110813 .4226658 .3120059 .3053463
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 1
Observations 605427 603008 2419 516093 87705
Population 
Density1992
Mean 152.4166 152.2745 187.772 175.1785 18.47594
Std. Deviation 158.4441 158.4191 160.708 160.409 20.71147
Min .5906883 .5906883 .5906883 .5906883 .5906883
Max 384.0063 384.0063 384.0063 384.0063 70.77139
Observations 603798 601381 2417 516093 87705
Notes: The sample contains 605 427 observations from 88992 firms. All monetary terms are expressed in thousand euros and countable 
variables in single units. Startup defines firms that are no more than three years old. Population density is based on NUTS4 classification.
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Table 1 shows that the average patent count in the sample was only 0.02 patents
per year due to the large amount of non-patenting firms. Around 11 per cent of the
observation within the subsidised firms (treatment group) filed a patent application
over a cumulative period of five years, whereas the same value was only around
0.5 per cent among non-subsidised firms (control group). The treated firms are also
found to have more active patenting history prior to the sample period31, as reported
in row 5. On average, the supported firms are also larger in terms of revenues, sales
and employment. It is also interesting to note that the share of start-up-firms in
the treatment group is twice as large as in the control group, which indicates Tekes’
preference in supporting younger firms. Note that the number of annual patents is
more than ten times smaller in the ERDF1 region. However, the share of subsidised
firms in the ERDF1 region is relatively high despite of their poor performance in
terms of patented innovations, which could weakly indicate that firms in ERDF1
region are more likely to become accepted into the R&D support program.
5 Empirical Strategy
The following section will present my empirical approach on assessing the effect of
R&D subsidies on patenting. The question will be studied mainly with probabilistic
specifications, although I test the results against count data models. I will address
the program selection bias by employing IV methods for both probabilistic and count
specifications.
5.1 General Framework
My patent count distribution is highly skewed towards zero, and therefore I can-
not use standard logarithmic transformations for the patenting variable. I begin
by neglecting potential endogeneity problems, and present simple linear and non-
linear probabilistic regression models and count models, which work as a baseline
specification and provide intuition for further model elaboration.
31Prior patents are counted during twenty years before the sample period.
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An outcome variable for patent counts can be formalised as
Patentsi,[t+1,t+5] =
t+5∑
j=t+1
Patenti,j, (1)
which describes the cumulative number of patent applications made by firm i during
the five years following period t. Note that the outcome can be also understood as
difference in levels for cumulative patents from t + 5 to t. The interval of five
years has been selected in order to ensure that the firms have sufficient time for
R&D project implementation and patenting procedures. It must be taken into
consideration that if the selected lead length is too long, the estimated effect may
no longer stem solely from the treatment. On the other hand, excessively short
interval does not necessarily account for all the patents stemming from the R&D
project. The adequacy of the 5-year lead length will be later tested. The outcome
for the probabilistic models is simply a binary indicator for filing at least one patent
application during the five following years, or formally
1(Patentsi,[t+1,t+5]) = 1(
t+5∑
j=t+1
Patenti,j > 0). (2)
I define a binary treatment variable Ti,t to stand for R&D program participation.
The treatment variable takes a value one for firms who did not received subsidies at
moment t−1, became program participants at t and received subsidies at t+1. The
specification aims to capture the program participation effect only for new projects
by excluding firms that already received subsidies during the year prior to the mo-
ment of examination. The specification is further motivated by two reasons: First,
it accounts for possible problems stemming from the fact that the exact moment
of program approval cannot be observed, and therefore, part of the participation
effect could leak to the period before the first payment. For instance, it is possi-
ble that the approval decision affects innovation, even before the first subsidies are
disbursed. The approval decision could affect innovation, for instance, due to govern-
ment agency’s technical support. Private financiers are also more likely to provide
early financing for projects that have been approved by the public R&D program.
Second, patenting behaviour could affect the probability to receive a grant, which
would lead to simultaneous causality. Accounting for the period prior to year t
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ensures that the treatment is determined before the outcome32. The program is
allowed to last until to period t+1, in order to allow some time for the government
agency to disburse payments. The lead length is limited to one year because most
of the subsidies in Tekes programs are generally paid during the first two years of
implementation (Einiö, forthcoming).
After defining the treatment and outcome variables, most of the regression models
in this study can be described in a generalised linear models (GLM) framework. I
will universally use Yi,t to refer to the outcome variable, which is a binary indicator
for probabilistic models and count-valued for the count models. I will assume that
the patent outcome variable Yi,t follows a probability distribution, and that the ex-
pected value of this random variable E(Yi,t) is transformed by the link function h(·)
into a value predicted by the linear predictor ηi.t; or formally:
Linear Predictor : ηi,t = α + τTi,t, (3)
Link Function : h(E(Yi,t)) ≡ h(µi,t) = ηi,t, (4)
where h(·) is smooth, invertible function, which is used to linearise the expectation
of the response variable. The expectation can then be written with an inverse link
function as follows:
µi,t = h
−1(ηi,t).
The distribution families and their corresponding link functions used in this study
are presented below.
32Although, patenting could still affect program participation if patenting during the period of
project approval has affected the approval decision. However, this is unlikely to be a major
concern, since the treatment decision is more likely to be based on longer-term performance,
e.g. patenting history, which will be later controlled for.
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Table 2: Distributional Families and Link Functions
Family Link ηi,t = h(µi,t)
Gaussian Identity µi,t
Binomial Logit log( µi,t
1−µi,t )
Binomial Probit Φ−1(µi,t)
Poisson Log log(µi,t)
Negative Binomial Log log( µi,t
µi,t+k
)
Note: µi,t is the expected value of the response; ηi,t stands for the linear predictor; Φ(•)
indicates the cumulative distribution function for standard normal distribution and k
stands for the overdispersion parameter that is estimated via maximum likelihood.
In case of a binary outcome variable, the outcome can be understood as a result
of a series of Bernoulli trials, where each separate trial has its own probability of
’success’ (patent application). The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator assumes a
gaussian error and an identity link function. Therefore, the linear predictor simply
stands for the expected value of the response, and the expected value µi can be
interpreted as the probability of success33. Linear probability models (LPMs) are
often criticised for producing predictions, which are not bounded by the probability
interval [0, 1]. However, the seemingly irrational values do not bias the estimates of
the treatment effect because they are based on the difference between the treatment
and control groups. Therefore, the irrational intercept values will be cancelled out.
Predictions based on linear probability models would require extra caution due to
the unbounded probabilities, but predicting is not the goal in this thesis. Linear
probability models provide similar estimates to traditional non-linear models, such
as logit and probit, only when the estimated probabilities of these non-linear models
are close the centre point of the probability interval34. Because the average patenting
in the sample is very low, the estimated probabilities are low as well, which suggests
that linear and non-linear models are likely to produce somewhat different results.
Logit and probit models are non-linear probability models, which have the attractive
property that their values are bounded between the probability interval. Non-linear
probability models may also provide additional efficiency gain to a standard linear
33Note that when the outcome Y is binary: E(Y |X) = P (Y = 1|X).
34Note that e.g. logit and probit distributions are nearly linear around probability estimates close
to 0.5
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model. Another major difference to linear models is that for non-linear probability
models, the estimated marginal effects are not constant. The estimated marginal
effects depend on the point of the fitted curve where they are calculated at. In this
thesis, I have a congruent approach to calculate the marginal effects at means.
The final two specifications of table 2 are used for count data. The first of the count
data specifications assumes that the outcome variable follows a Poisson distribu-
tion. Poisson distribution is commonly used to describe rare events or counts, such
as patent applications during a fixed time interval. Poisson distribution allows a
good starting point for count analysis, since patent applications per firm are rare,
discrete events which can only take positive values. If annual patent applications
per firm are assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, the cumulative patent vari-
able can be also described by a Poisson model, since general statistical theory states
that the sum of Poisson distributed random variables is itself a Poisson distributed
random variable. However, Poisson distributed dependent variable are restricted
by the mean-variance equality. The descriptive statistics in table 1 show that the
unconditional variance of the patent outcome exceeds the mean, indicating that
the data might be overdispersed. Negative binomial distribution is a Poisson mix-
ture model35, which is often recommended for estimating over-dispersed count data.
Negative binomial distribution includes an additional over-dispersion parameter, al-
lowing for differing variance and mean. When the over-dispersion parameter is set
to zero, a negative-binomial model reduces down to a simple Poisson model.
Count-data distributions, such as Poisson and negative binomial distributions may
provide biased estimates, when the sample includes a large number of excess zeros.
Although many of the firms unlikely to conduct any innovative activities have been
removed from the sample, the the average share of patenting firms is still very low36.
Therefore, I will run the count-data models also only for active innovators, where
the average propensity to patent is considerably higher. An additional source of
excess zeros are firms that choose to conceal innovations instead of patenting them.
However, these firms are by definition hard (if not impossible) to exclude from the
35There are several ways of modelling count data with negative-binomial distribution. An intuitive
approach is proposed by McCullagh and Nelder (1989). They show that when a Poisson model
is adopted, and it is further assumed that the expected count itself is a gamma distributed
random variable with mean µ and a constant scale parameter ω, then the observed variable
will follow a negative binomial distribution.
36See section 4.
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sample. Problems associated with these firms will be discussed more in section 7.
The naïve comparison between supported and non-supported firms in equation 3 is
likely to produce biased estimates, because program participants are not randomly
selected from the firm population. I will complement the above specification by al-
lowing for differences in average R&D subsidies across industries. It is also possible
that the time patterns of R&D investment vary between firms and industries, for ex-
ample if financing is allocated along the expected growth potential of the industry.
Therefore, I will augment equation 3 with industry(k)-year(t) fixed effects φk(i),t.
The program estimates are also prone to self-selection bias, because firms engaged
in innovative activities are presumably more likely to patent and more motivated to
apply for R&D support. In addition, R&D program selection criteria aim to scan for
innovative firms. Neglecting the omitted variables that positively affect the treat-
ment decision and innovation, would make the error term positively correlated with
both the treatment and the outcome variables and lead to exaggerated treatment
estimates. I will allow for inherited differences between firm innovativeness by con-
trolling for pre-treatment control characteristics Xi,t−1 and estimate the following
model
ηi,t = α + τTi,t +X
′
i,t−1β + φi(k),t + i,t, (5)
where ηi,t = h(E(Yi,t)) and Ti,t and Yi,t stand for the patent outcome variable and
the treatment indicator as specified earlier. As explained above, the outcome can
be understood as a difference in levels of cumulative patents. Since the treatment
is also defined over multiple periods, the linear specification is equivalent to a fixed
effects specification for levels of cumulative patents37.
The control variable vector Xi,t−1 includes control variables for firm size. Acs and
37This can be seen by including firm-specific intercepts and writing the specifications separately
for periods t and t+5 and then subtracting the first equation from the second. However, since
the cumulative period is longer than the conditional period for the treatment, it is possible
that for some firms the benefits from two consecutive projects would become intertwined. In
total, there is 71 firms in the sample where the benefits from two projects could be overlapping.
It will be later tested if these firms affect the results by including only firms that fulfilled the
criteria for treatment group only once. I do not run fixed effects specifications for the presented
non-linear models, because in order to estimate the marginal predicted probabilities or the
predicted number of events, one would have to assume that fixed effects would be zero (see
Wooldridge, 2002).
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Audretsch (1988) find that the innovation inputs have unequivocal effect on patent-
ing, depending on the size of the innovating firm. I have excluded the largest and
smallest firms, but the sample firms still differ considerably in their size. The firms
also have differing production structures, which depend on the products or services
they produce. Therefore, some firms may for instance have a high volume of sales
with relatively small staff, whereas production in some firms is very labour intensive.
A single size control is therefore unlikely to fully capture the effect of firm size on
patenting. The pre-treatment control characteristics Xi,t−1 controls for annual firm
revenues, sales and the number of employees38, which should allow for a relatively
flexible control of the firm size, despite of the differing production structures across
firms.
Innovative capacity of a firm can also depend on the available physical and human
capital. Educated workers are likely to be associated with a higher level of innova-
tions, although the importance of physical capital on innovation is quite somewhat
more ambiguous. On one hand, certain level of technology (e.g. computers) can help
in creating new innovations. On the other hand, the physical capital intensity is es-
pecially high for firms using heavy processing technology, where the capital may not
play a major role in creating new innovations. In order to allow firms to have differ-
ing ratios of human and physical capital, the vector Xi,t−1 includes control variables
for (log) fixed capita per employee and (log) average wages. In addition, a dummy
variable control has been added for firms that have patented before the examination
period. Patent history is an indicator of the firm’s past innovative activeness, and
in that sense, it will also control for a considerable share of the differences across
firms in their initial propensity to innovate. Czarnitski et al. (2007) show that a
firm’s patenting history has considerable effect on the firm’s probability to innovate
later. Finally, I have accounted for Tekes’ relative preference for young firms39 by
including a dummy variable for new start-up-firms (firms that are less than three
years old).
38All of these variables are log-transformed.
39In 2012, 35 per cent of the Tekes’ subsidies were allocated to firms less than six years old (Tekes,
2012b)
5 Empirical Strategy 34
5.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
The selection criteria of the Finnish R&D program explicitly states that program
participants are selected partly according to their commercial potential, technolog-
ical limitations and based on the availability of funding sources. These variables
are also likely to affect innovation, which would make the treatment variable Ti,t in
equation 5 correlated with the error term i,t. I do not observe these variables, and
therefore equation 5 could produce biased estimates for the treatment effect. I will
address the omitted variables bias by relying on instrumental variable methods.
For the linear probability model, I will estimate the treatment effect with a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. I will employ an instrument introduced by
Einiö (fortcoming), which exploits the regional variation in R&D financing created
by population density rules for ERDF aid (see section 3.2). The binary instrumen-
tal variable Wr(i) takes a value one for firms i registered in a NUTS440 region r
that is eligible for the highest level of aid (ERDF1) and zero otherwise. The key
identifying assumptions for instrument validity are that the instrument is relevant
(corr(W,T ) 6= 0) and exogenous (corr(W, ) = 0). That is, the instrument should
have a clear effect on the dependent variable through the endogenous treatment
variable Ti,t, but not through any other way. The discussion in section 3.2 and
descriptive statistics in table 1 provided some support for the assumption of in-
strument relevance. Instrument exogeneity also seems plausible, since ERDF aid
allocation is based on the 1992 population density (see section 3.2), which by itself
is unlikely to affect firm’s propensity to patent during the sample period. However,
densely populated areas could benefit from greater knowledge spill-over effects due
to higher number of social interactions (Glaeser, 1999). Knowledge spill-overs can
induce higher expected returns to R&D, and therefore, firms in densely populated
regions could be more innovative. To address this concern, I will control for (log)
population density in 1992.
Because eligibility for ERDF1 aid is purely based on population density, omitted
regional variables that are uncorrelated with the population density are therefore
also likely to be uncorrelated with the instrument (Einiö, forthcoming). However,
some regional characteristics, such as age structure or average education, could affect
innovation even if they would not affect the treatment. Therefore, I will augment
40NUTS3 for period 2007-2009
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the by including region specific control variables for the working age population
share and the population shares of both primary and secondary education in order
to improve the model fit. I will then estimate the following linear equation:
Y = αIV + φIVk(i),t + τiTi,t +X
′
i,t−1β
IV +R′r(i)ϕ
IV + vIVi,t , (6)
and instrument the treatment Ti,t with the ERDF indicator as presented below
Ti,t = α
1st + φ1stk(i),t + γWr(i) +X
′
i,t−1β
1st +R′r(i)ϕ1st + v1sti,t . (7)
The superscripts stand for the coefficients for the first stage and IV estimates, R′r(i)
is a vector of region specific control variables and Wr(i) is the previously introduced
ERDF indicator. Otherwise the included variables are the same as in equation (5).
The equations above explicitly show that the treatment effect is allowed to vary
across firms, because the subsidy amounts differ across projects. Imbens and Angrist
(1994) have shown that in case of heterogeneous treatment effect, the IV estimate
of the treatment parameter describes the local average treatment effect (LATE). In
other words, the estimated coefficient τˆi describes the subsidy program effect for
subsidised firms that would not have received R&D subsidies, had they not been
located in the ERDF1 region. Assuming that the model is correctly specified, the
2SLS estimator will provide consistent estimates of the LATE, even if the data is
not truly linear (Angrist, 2001).
Nonlinear models require stronger assumptions on the distributional form, but when
correctly specified they may provide additional gain in terms of efficiency. I will es-
timate the instrumental variable model for count data, in order to account for firms
that have several patents. Method of moment estimators date back to Pearson
(1895), which laid the basis for estimating model parameters by solving sample
moment conditions. The modern GMM estimator, as its name suggests, is a gen-
eralization of the method of moments estimator introduced by Hansen (1982). To
sketch down the basic idea behind the GMM estimators, let wi41 stand for i.i.d
observations on data vector w, and each sub-vector wi consists of random variables
41The notation dates back to the original paper by Hansen (1982), and is widely used across GMM
literature.
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for firm i as described in above equations 6-7. The data is assumed to stem from a
statistical process, which depends on a p× 1 dimensional parameter vector θ. Now,
let gi(wi,θ) stand for a m × 1 vector that consists of functions dependent on wi
and parameters θ, so that m > p. The parameters are assumed to have true values
θ0 ∈ θ in the model, which would satisfy the population moment (or orthogonality)
conditions42
E[gi(wi,θ0)] = 0. (8)
Moment estimators are functions on averages of random variables, and therefore
according to the law of large numbers, the sample estimates converge to their theo-
retical (population) counterparts in large samples, implying consistency. The sample
analog of the theoretical expectation E[·] is a sample average
g¯(w, θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
gi(wi,θ). (9)
When m > p the system of moment conditions is over-identified and there generally
exists no unique solution for θ. GMM estimator finds the parameter values that
are “closest” to satisfying the moment conditions, or formally the values of θ that
minimize the function
Q(θ) = g¯(w,θ)′Wg¯(w,θ), (10)
where W is a m × m positive semi-definite weighing matrix. Therefore, GMM
estimator can be written as
θˆGMM ≡ arg minθQ(θ). (11)
42For illustration, general OLS estimator assumes strict exogeneity E[i|xi] = 0, which implies
orthogonality E(x′ii) = 0. The OLS estimator is based on finding the parameters that solve
the sample analog of the theoretical population moments E[x′i(y−x′iθ)] = 0. Therefore, OLS
can be understood as a method of moments estimator for linear g(·).
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In my case, the number of moment conditions is equal to the number of unknown
parameters (m = p), so the model is exactly identified43. The estimator reduces
down to a method of moments estimator and the parameter vector has a unique
solution, which can be estimated directly by solving the parameters from
g¯(w, θ) = 0. (12)
Until the late 90’s, count data literature simply assumed that the explanatory vari-
ables were exogenous (Mullahy, 1997). However, in some applications the assump-
tion on exogeneity can be rather bold as discussed above. In order to allow for
endogenous explanatory variables in a Poisson type count model, I will follow the
approach of Mullahy (ibid), who was the first to introduce suitable moment condi-
tions for non-linear count data with endogenous regressors. The trick is to trans-
form the moment conditions so that the unobserved heterogeneity (Λi) would be
additively separable from the endogenous variables 44. To derive the moment con-
ditions, I will use the notations from equations 6-7, denote si = (1,Xi,Rr(i), Ti) and
θ = (α1st, αIV , φ1st, φIV ,β1st,βIV ,ϕ1st,ϕIV , γ, δ)45 and write the patenting model
as
Yi = exp(s
′
iθ)λi + ui ≡ µiλi + ui, (13)
where λi = exp(Λi) stands for unobservable heterogeneity and ui is a random error.
Assuming that the instrument Wr(i) is valid46 and by subtracting and dividing both
sides of equation 13 by µi yields additively separable conditional moment conditions
43The IV-model has as one instrument and one endogenous variable. Therefore, there is orthog-
onality condition for the instrument and orthogonality assumptions for all the other control
variables, which implies exact identification.
44The most “obvious” moment conditions for IV-estimation for poisson distribution would be
derived directly by specifying the residual function to be of the form ui(yi, xi,θ) = yi − exiθ,
where some elements of xi are endogenous. However, non-linear IV estimators based on residual
function ui will not be consistent for θ even with a help of valid instrumental variables zi,
because due to the exponential function of xi, the endogenous elements of xi are not additively
separable from the exogenous elements xi in the residual function ui(yi, xi,θ), which leads to
a violation of conditional moment restriction E(ui(yi, xi,θ)|zi) = 0 (Mullahy, 1997).
45The subscripts for time t have been omitted for simplicity.
46Implying that E(ui|si,Wr(i)) = 0 holds, and that E(λi|Wr(i)) is a constant (normalised to one)
that is independent of the unobserved heterogeneity λi.
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E((
Yi − µi
µi
)|Wr(i)) = 0, (14)
which can be written as a sample analog
g¯(si,Wr(i),θ) ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
gi(si,Wr(i),θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Wi(
Yi − µi
µi
). (15)
Since the number of moment conditions47 is equal to the number of parameters in
θ, the parameters can be solved directly by setting equation (15) equal to zero as
explained above.
Mullahy’s strategy is attractive for estimations where the endogenous variable is
discrete, because it does not require any assumptions regarding the distribution
of the endogenous variable given the instruments48 in contrast to commonly used
hurdle and control function approaches (see Wooldridge, 2002).
The next section will present the results for the empirical models and show how
different models compare against each others.
6 Results
The following section will present the main results of the paper. I will first report
estimates for the effect of R&D program participation on patenting probability,
and then present the results for count models. I find that program participation is
associated with an increase in patenting probability when selection bias is neglected,
but that the results cannot be confirmed with the IV estimates. Count models and
probability models provide rather similar estimates due to low number of patents
per average patentee when treatment is assumed exogenous. However, I find that
the linear IV estimates are considerably more robust than the GMM estimates for
the count data when I account for the endogenous treatment.
47In total, there is 12 moment conditions (11 for the controls and one for the instrument) of the
form: 1n
n∑
i=1
m′i(Yi−µiµi ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
m′i(Yiµi − 1) = 0, where mi = (Wr(i),Xi,Rr(i)).
48Other than the standard rank condition required for identification in non-liner models.
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6.1 Effect on Patenting Probability
I will begin with a simple linear probability model. The results are reported in the
table 3 below.
The first column reports the estimates for the treatment and control variables, con-
trolling only for pre-treatment firm characteristics. The R&D program participation
is associated with an average increase of some 4.1 percentage points in the proba-
bility to file a patent application in the following five years. The positive treatment
effect is highly significant with a t-value close to 13. The specification in column (2)
controls also for industry-year fixed effects. The additional control variables have
only a small effect on the treatment estimate. Minor effect could indicate that the
treatment decision is not largely driven by industry-year differences, which would
not be already captured by the controlled fixed and time varying firm characteristics.
The fit of the model in terms of the adjusted R2 remains almost identical, although
nearly all of the interaction terms were found significant (not reported).
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Table 3: LPM estimates for R&D program effect on patenting probability
Outcome:1(patentst+1-t+5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1(R&D programt)
0.0408597
(0.0031892)***
0.0393662
(0.0035414)***
0.0068445
(0.0021205)***
0.1111854
(0.035393)***
log(revenuet-1)
-0.0117748
(0.0029372)***
-0.0114591
(0.0029116)***
-0.0010376
(0.0011256)
-0.044939
(0.0222718)*
log(average waget-1)
0.0015763
(0.00005714)**
0.0009726
(0.000484)*
-0.0001929
(0.0002112)
0.0839312
(0.0244957)***
log(employmentt-1)
0.0032122
(0.0011089)**
0.0023742
(0.0008712)**
0.0000332
(0.00035)
0.0755472
(0.0235584)***
log(salest-1)
0.0122231
(0.0034474)***
0.01259
(0.0034523)***
0.0013744
(0.0014654)
0.0154087
(0.0274543)
log(fixed assets per 
employeet-1)
0.0008167
(0.0004912)
0.0007839
(0.0004406)
0.00002271
(0.0001774)
0.0231401
(0.0722549)***
1(startupt-1)
0.0025403
(0.0013762)*
0.0026598
(0.0013521)*
0.0011041
(0.001337)
0.027543
(0.0722549)
1(patented before 2000) 0.2733828(0.018474)***
0.271486
(0.0189278)***
Intercept -0.0333246(0.0183681)*
-0.0363007
(0.187365)*
0.0004184
(0.0020624)
 -0.9508626
(0.1653512)***
Observations
(Groups) 131 814 131 814
131 814
(63 343) 1 306
Adj. R2 0.154 0.155 0.006 0.113
Industry-Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects No No Yes No
Prior patentees only No No No Yes
Note: The outcome is an indicator variable for firms that patented during [t+1, t+5]. Standard errors clustered by 2-digit 
NACE industry are presented in parenthesis. Industry-year fixed effects are aggregated to 16-levels, based on 2-digit 
NACE classifications. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
In the final column, I have assessed the treatment effect in a sub-sample that in-
cludes only firms who have filed some patents before the sample period (hereafter
‘prior patentees’ or ‘active patentees’). The patenting intensity within prior paten-
tees is notably higher than in the full sample. An average firm within the group of
prior patentees filed 26 patents during the sample period49, whereas for all the other
firms the average number of patents was only around 0.1. The estimated effect in
column (3) is around 11 percentage point increase in the patenting probability. The
results would indicate that the R&D support would have a considerable impact for
firms who have shown earlier indication of innovative activeness. The final specifica-
49The probability to receive subsidies is also notably higher for prior patentees. An average
probability for prior patentees to belong to the treatment group was 32 per cent, whereas for
all the other firms the probability was only around 3 per cent.
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tion in column (3) is motivated by the idea that firms that have been innovative in
the past, or have experience in patenting, are likely to engage some R&D activities
also in future. In fact, the indicator for prior patentees is by far the most impor-
tant determinant of patenting probability also in specifications (1) and (2). Also
Czarnizki et al. (2007) report similar results and highlight the importance of earlier
patents on future patenting. They estimate that within firms that conduct some
R&D, program participants are 10 per cent more likely to patent than the control
group.
It seems natural that innovative firms in the past are more innovative in the future
as well. However, it is much harder to define the determinants that make these
firms innovative in the first place. In order to increase the understanding of the
determinants of innovativeness, table 3 also reports a full set of firm specific control
variables. Previous research has indicated that firm size has a considerable effect on
the firms’ propensity to patent (Acs and Audretsch, 1988). However, as discussed
in section 5, defining the size of a firms may not always be quite that straight-
forward because the output structures differ across firms. The results in table 3
show that firms with many employees and high sales volumes are associated with
higher innovative activeness. On the other hand, annual revenues are associated
with lower patenting; a ten per cent increase in annual revenues decrease the av-
erage probability to patent by 0.11 percentage points50. The discrepancy between
the indicators indicate that the innovating firms differ in their production structure.
Higher salaries are expected to positively correlate with education, which is expected
to positively affect innovation. The estimate is small but significant. Start-up firms
are also found more innovative, although the effect is weakly significant only in the
first two columns. Capital intensity has a significant effect on patenting only among
prior patentees. Finally, one should note that the linear probability model has a
negative intercept. However, as was discussed in section 5, this does not affect the
estimates of the treatment effect.
Micro-econometric literature has very polarised opinions about linear probability
models. Advocates of LPM argue that it performs well in most contexts and em-
phasize its simplicity and robustness (e.g. Angrist, 2001; Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The antagonists point out that linear probability models may provide poor estimates
50-0.0117748*log(1.1)=0.001122
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near the probability limits and highlight the possible efficiency gains with non-linear
models (e.g. Honoré and Lewbel, 2004). In table 4, I have compared the linear model
to non-linear probability models.
Table 4 reports marginal effects for logit and probit models for the specifications
introduced in table 3. OLS results are provided for easier comparison.
Table 4: GLM estimates of R&D program effect on patenting probability
Probability model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 0.0773527
(0.0062201)***
0.0550883
(0.0014087)***
0.0519089
(0.00181)***
0.0393662
(0.0035414)***
0.1111854
(0.035393)***
Probit 0.0161245
(0.0058779)***
0.0032882
(0.0010845)***
0.0012215
(0.0004305)***
0.0010948
(0.0001684)***
0.1063726
(0.0321243)***
Logit 0.0133707
(0.0051069)***
0.0024248
(0.0007559)***
0.0008632
(0.0002552)***
0.0010069
(0.0001436)***
0.0842516
(0.0253391)***
Observations 190 290 131 814 131 814 131 814 1 306
Pre-treatment Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Patent History Control No No No Yes Yes
Prior patentees only No No No No Yes
Note: The non-linear estimation results are marginal treatment effects when all the other variables are fixed to their 
mean.  Standard errors clustered by 2-digit NACE industry are presented in parenthesis. Industry-year fixed effects are 
aggregated to 16-levels, based on 2-digit NACE classifications. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
As expected, logit and probit estimates are very much alike throughout the specifi-
cations, although both the estimates and standard errors are somewhat smaller for
logit model. Column (1) estimates a model without any additional control variables.
Both non-linear models estimate that the treatment is associated with an around 1.5
percentage point marginal effect in probability to patent during the five following
years after the approval decision. The estimate for the linear probability model is
about seven times higher. The most likely reason is that unlike in linear model, the
marginal effects in non-linear models depend on the part of the distribution where
the marginal effects are calculated. When the sample includes a large number of
non-treated firms, the mean value of the treatment variable becomes low, and there-
fore, logit and probit results are based more on the observations at the lower end of
the distribution.
Column (2) includes pre-treatment control variables. As can be expected, the es-
timates for the treatment effect reduces throughout the model choices, since most
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of the included control variables correlate positively with both the treatment and
patenting variable. Column (3) accounts for industry-year-fixed effects, which have
somewhat larger effect on the treatment estimates in the non-linear models than was
previously found for the LPM. The reason is that since the marginal effects are cal-
culated at means, the additional variables also change the point of the curve where
the marginal treatment effect is calculated at. In column (4), patenting history is
controlled, which does not have a great effect on the non-linear estimates, but the
precision gain is considerable with standard errors decreasing almost by two thirds
in the probit model and nearly halves in the logit case. In column (5), the estimates
for prior patentees are quite similar regardless of the chosen model; the increase
in patenting probability varying around 8 to 11 percentage points. Among active
patentees, the mean values of the included variables are much less packed towards
origin, which results in marginal estimates close to OLS estimates.
One cannot unequivocally say if non-linear or linear probability models should be
preferred, because in the full sample, they capture effects for somewhat different
firms. One argument supporting the use of LPMs is that a large number of the firms
in the full sample are unlikely to conduct any R&D activities or aim at filing any
patents, which means that they can be thought to produce additional noise to the
actual question of interest. LPMs are somewhat less sensitive to the observation at
the lower end of the patenting distribution than the non-linear models, because the
marginal effect is constant. In addition, OLS does not seem to perform significantly
worse in terms of efficiency in the restricted sample. However, the most important
advantage of LPM relates to endogenous binary treatment variables: To my best
knowledge there exists no consistent non-linear estimators for endogenous treatment
effect, when the outcome, instrument and treatment variables are all binary51.
All the above estimates could be biased, if the R&D program eligibility depends on
unobserved attributes that affect innovation, such as other sources of R&D financing.
I will address the concern by instrumenting the treatment decision with a dummy
variable for regions eligible for the highest level of aid from the European Union
Regional Development Fund (ERDF 1). The IV estimation results are reported in
table 5.
51For further discussion, see Wooldridge (2002)
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Table 5: 2SLS Estimates of R&D program effect on patenting probability
Estimation Method: 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ERDF 1 0 .0003287(0.0009643)
0.0010828
(0.0009004)
0.0010854
(0.0008943)
0.0029523
(0.0011493)**
0.0251942 
(0.0274732)
1(patented before 2000) 0.0577945(0.00691)***
0.0576037
(0.0069308)***
log(population density 1992) 0.000145(0.000495)
-0.0125637
(0.011215)
F-value on excluded instruments 0.12 1.45 1.47 6.6 0.51
R&D Program -1.634124
(5.723748)
-0.3736764
(0.6537787)
-0.3611901
(0.6176162)
0.1107702
(0.1883068)
3.120165
(4.416325)
1(patented before 2000) 0.2946286
(0.0401661)***
0.2672742
(0.0271643)***
log(population density 1992) 0.0000065
(0.0002591)
0.0580924 
(0.0815062)
Observations 131785 131785 131785 131785 1 306
Pre-treatment Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent History Control No No Yes Yes No
Regional Controls No No No Yes Yes
Prior Patentees Only No No No No Yes
Panel A. First Stage
Panel B. IV-results
Note: The outcome for the first stage is an indicator variable for treated firms, and for the second stage an indicator variable for firms 
that patented during [t+1, t+5]. The instrument is an indicator for firms located in ERDF1 region. Standard errors clustered by NUTS4 
regions are presented in parenthesis. Industry-year fixed effects are aggregated to 16-levels, based on 2-digit NACE classifications. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
Panel A reports the first stage estimates for different specifications. The first stage
estimates for the first three columns have the expected signs, but the estimates are
insignificant. The included set of control variables are identical to earlier estimations.
It’s interesting to note that all of the control variables were found significant52 and
of the same sign as in the OLS estimation of table 3, which could indicate that the
program selection criteria put value on the same attributes that affect innovation.
However, it is possible that these firms would conduct R&D activities even in the
absence of government support. When regional control characteristics53 are included
52Not reported here.
53See section 5.2 for full description
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in column (4), the instrument becomes significant at 5 percent confidence level
(p-value 0.012). A small but significant estimate of 0.003 indicates that firms in the
regions eligible for the highest level of aid are more probable to become accepted into
the R&D support program. The f-value for excluded instrument is also considerable
higher in column (4) than for the other specification. However, the f-value remains
below 10, which is commonly used as a rule of thumb indicator for instrument
relevance. The first stage estimates are considerably lower than the estimates of
Einiö (forthcoming), which are around 0.1 to 0.15. One explanation for smaller
estimates could be due to the firm location reported in tax returns. Firms with
several offices may decide to conduct their R&D activities in regions eligible for
higher ERDF support, although the address reported in their tax returns would
be elsewhere, e.g. their headquarters, which are commonly located in urban areas.
Another explanation could be that a large share of the firms in the sample are
not treated regardless of their location. Therefore, column (5) analyses only prior
patentees, who have considerably higher participation rates. The first stage estimate
does in fact increase, but it becomes highly insignificant.
Panel B of table 5 reports the IV-results for the R&D program effect on patenting
probability. The causal effect of the R&D program is insignificant throughout the
specifications. In the first three specifications the estimate is also of the unexpected
sign, although it must be noted that the standard errors are also fairly large. When
the region specific controls are included, the effect turns positive, although insignif-
icant. The estimate increases from column (3) to column (4) because population
density is negatively correlated with the instrument (ERDF 1 regions have lower
population density) but positively correlated with patenting.
Table 5 does not provide causal evidence for the effectivity of the R&D support
program. However, it may be that the instrument simply does produce enough
exogenous variation to the program participation status. Another concern is that
firms often centralise their intellectual property under their headquarters, which
would reduce the treatment effect if the firms conduct their R&D activities in ERDF1
region. Finally, it is possible that government R&D programs increase the R&D
efforts in these firms, but these efforts do not translate into patents.
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6.2 Effect on Patent Counts
Most of the patenting firms file only a single patent application annually, therefore
patenting probability is likely to produce similar estimates to count models. How-
ever, probabilistic models would underestimate the impacts for projects that yield
several patents. I will now shift from studying the R&D program effect on patenting
probability to assessing the effect on the number of applied patents and test if count
models would provide support for the program effectiveness. Table 6 reports the
estimates for patent count models.
Table 6: GLM estimates of R&D program effect on patent counts
Count Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS  -0.0510153
(0.0624015)
0.110294
(0.0401283 )**
0.1075344 
(0.0392141)**
0.1231166
(0.0398825)***
0.2209055
(0.0480504)***
Poisson 0.1962598
(0.0435351)***
-0.0006518
(0.000346)*
0.0001341
(0.0000773)*
0.000297
(0.0001801)*
0.1854057
(0.17388)
NegBin
0.1962598   
(0.0435351)***
 0.0042727   
(0.0018584)**
0.0011444
(0.0005748)**
0.0014889
(0.0002995)**
0.2629784
(0.17656)
Observations
190 290
(1 244)
131 814
(817)
131 814
(817)
131 814
(817)
1 306
(399)
Pre-treatment Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Patent History Control No No No Yes Yes
Prior Patentees Only No No No No Yes
Note: The outcome is a patent count during [t+1, t+5]. The non-linear estimation results are marginal treatment effects when all the 
other variables are fixed to their mean.  Standard errors clustered by 2-digit NACE industry are presented in parenthesis. Industry-
year fixed effects are aggregated to 16-levels, based on 2-digit NACE classifications. The observations in parenthesis stand for OLS 
regression with a log-transformed outcome. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
The first row of the table reports the for a simple OLS regression, where the
5-year cumulative patent outcome is log-transformed. The results show why log-
transformation is generally not recommended for count variables. The R&D pro-
gram participation is associated with around 1.1 patent increase54 regardless of the
included control variables, and for prior patentees the estimate is somewhat bigger
(1.2 patents). The estimates seem awfully large when compared to the probabilistic
estimates, and the reason is that log-transformation excludes all the observation for
non-patenting firms (note the reduced number of observations). Therefore, these
54See for example column (2): exp(0.110294) ≈ 1.1.
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estimates could be better understood as program induced increase in filed patent
applications among patenting firms, rather than the actual effect on all firms.
The second row reports the estimates for Poisson model. Among all firms, the es-
timates are mainly only marginally significant and even have an unexpected sign
in column (2). According to the estimates the program participants would file only
marginally more than the untreated firms. It is also alarming to note that the esti-
mates for Poisson model are smaller the corresponding estimates for the probabilistic
models, which is theoretically impossible if both models would be able to describe
the data correctly. In order to test if excess zeros affect the estimates, column (4)
assesses only prior patentees. The marginal treatment effect is larger than the cor-
responding estimates for probability models, but it becomes insignificant. I found
that the expected increase in log-counts was positive and significant, but most of
this effect originated from the increase in patenting for firms among the highest 10
per cent of the patenting distribution.
The small estimates based on Poisson regression are likely to be biased due to over-
dispersion. In order to allow for over-dispersion, I estimate the same specifications
with a negative binomial model in the third row of table 6. Negative binomial model
is similar to Poisson, except that it includes an additional model parameter for over-
dispersion. The results of negative binomial and Poisson models are identical for the
column (1) because the data is actually under-dispersed when no control variables
are in. The dispersion parameter can only have positive values, and is therefore set
to zero, and the model reduces down to a Poisson model, as discussed in section 5.1.
The estimated effects for negative binomial model in columns (2) to (4) are positive
and significant at 5 per cent level. The estimates are also slightly higher than the
estimates for (non-linear) probability models. The results for the estimation with a
full set of control variables in column (4) indicate that treated firms file on average
0.001 additional patent applications during the five-year interval when compared to
the control group. In the final specification, the marginal effect at mean becomes
insignificant, although the effect on log-patent counts was significant at 5 percent
level, as was the case also for the Poisson model.
Finally, I will test how count models perform against probability models when en-
dogeneity is allowed. Results in table 7 are based on moment conditions introduced
by Mullahy (1997).
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Table 7: GMM estimations of R&D support program on patent counts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ERDF 1 0 .0003287(0.0009643)
0.0003365
(0.0006111 )
0.0021682 
(0.0007885)***
0.0226426
(0.0344719)
1(patented before 2000) 0.0649615(0.0649615)***
0.0648817
0.00249)***
log(population density 1992) 0.0000162 (0.0003231)
-0.0129524
(0.0104916)
F-value on excluded instruments 0.08 0.09 3.05 0.43
R&D Program -0.161872(0.66444)
15.08457
(2126539)
-2.091995
(1.961561)
712.8034 
(-)
1(patented before 2000) 4.626263(8.854531)
5.301308
(0.6322877)***
log(population density 1992) 0.316273(0.2016668)
-0.2993199 **
(0.1428698)
Observations 131785 131785 131785 1 306
Pre-treatment Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent History Control No Yes Yes No
Regional Controls No No Yes Yes
Prior Patentees Only No No No Yes
Panel A. First Stage
Panel B. IV-results
Note: The outcome is a patent count during [t+1, t+5]. The estimation is based on one-step GMM estimator using 
moment conditions proposed by Mullahy (1997). Standard errors are estimated by the asymptotic approximation 
introduced by Hansen (1982). The standard errors of the treatment effect go to infinity in the final specification. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
The industry-year fixed effects have been excluded, because a high number of inter-
action terms would require unfeasible amount of calculation time and could consid-
erably hinder the proper convergence of the GMM estimator. The linear first stage
results are reported in panel A. The instrument has the expected sign throughout the
specifications, but the estimate is significant only in column (3), which corresponds
to specification (4) in table 5 without industry-year fixed effects55.
The IV estimate for the treatment effect remains insignificant throughout the spec-
ifications. In addition, the results vary considerably across the specifications, indi-
cating that the convergence of the estimator is rather sensitive either to the possibly
weak instrument or to model form miss-specifications. In order to test if excess
zeros56 are driving the results, I estimate the same model only for prior patentees.
55Note the relatively small effect that the interaction terms have on the first stage estimates.
56To my best knowledge, there has not yet been introduced a method to incorporate instrumental
variables methods to zero-inflated Poisson or negative binomial models.
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The estimates explode and while the estimated values increase, the standard errors
go towards infinity as seen from specifications (2) and (4). The results of column (4)
would indicate that the poor convergence is most likely due to estimator’s sensitivity
to weak instruments57. The weakness relates to the orthogonality assumptions of
the GMM estimator. In GMM setup the orthogonality condition E[g(wi, θ0)] = 0
holds only at the true value of θ0. If the instrument is weak, so that the treatment
is only weakly correlated with the instrument, θ does no longer uniquely identify
θ0, even if the number of moment conditions is equal to the number of parameter.
When I changed the initial value of the GMM estimator for specification (4) the
estimator converged to a different value. The differing local minima confirms the
suspicion that the estimator cannot uniquely identify θ0.
Considering the above evidence, it seems likely that the GMM estimator based
on Mullahy’s (1997) moment conditions produces biased estimates due to weak
instruments. I would prefer simple linear 2SLS estimator, since the probabilistic
model does not seem to perform significantly worse in terms of efficiency, and it
would appear considerably more robust when there is a risk of a weak instrument.
6.3 Robustness Analysis
The previous sections indicated that probability models with a binary outcome vari-
able perform fairly well compared to count models, which require stronger distribu-
tional assumptions and were shown to be rather sensitive to instrument weaknesses.
Therefore, the estimations in this section are based on 2SLS specification of column
(4) in table 5 (i.e. ’the preferred specification’). The robustness of 2SLS estimator
lies behind the notion that when the explanatory variables are truly exogenous, both
OLS and 2SLS would provide similar, consistent estimates, although OLS would be
more efficient. Hausman (1978) suggested that endogeneity could be therefore tested
by comparing the results of 2SLS and OLS estimates. One can estimate the residual
57I also estimated a negative binomial model employing a control function approach proposed
by Wooldridge (2002). In this approach the first stage residuals are included in the second
stage, where the outcome is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution. The estimated
(insignificant) marginal effect was around -0.28. However, since the control function approach
utilises the first stage residuals in the second stage equation, one would have to assume that
the error term is joint normal, which is naturally not the case with discrete outcome variables.
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from the first stage regression and test its significance in the second stage58. The
test statistics for the final specification of table 5 yield a p-value of 0.71, and hence
Hausman test would not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. However, these
test statistics are only valid assuming that the instrument is valid. The weaker the
instrument, the more 2SLS estimates are biased towards OLS estimates59, which
leads Hausman test to reject the null hypothesis of exogenity too rarely. Although
Hausman test does not reject exogeneity, I will utilise 2SLS estimator as a precau-
tion for endogeneity, since there is some indications that the instrument might be
weak, and I cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias.
I will assess whether the R&D program can be found to foster innovation within
certain sub-populations and if the definition of the treatment and patent variables
are driving the results. Table 8 on the next page reports the results for various
re-specifications.
In column (1), I change the time interval for the cumulative patents from five to
three years. Both the first stage estimate and the standard error reduces slightly.
The instrument becomes significant at 1 per cent confidence level, but the increase
in accuracy might be purely due to the increased number of observations. Despite
the increased accuracy, the IV estimates remain highly insignificant. The negative
estimate could be purely coincidental, since the confidence interval is very wide.
It is also possible that patents are long-term results, and three years would not
be sufficient to account for the R&D program’s effect on patenting. In fact, the
three-year cumulative patents most likely accounts only for patents filed during the
implementation of an R&D project, and not the patents that have been produced
as a result of the project60.
58Actually, the same logic can also be applied to non-linear models with a linear first stage, by
changing the second stage linear equation to the corresponding non-linear equation (Wooldridge,
2002). The test statistics for specification (3) in table 7 yield a p-value of 0.38.
59Imagine for instance that the instrument would be purely random, which would make 2SLS
estimates identical to OLS.
60Remember from sections 2 and 3 that most of the R&D projects last more than two years, as
does an average patent application process.
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Column (2) tests if the treatment group specification affects the results. I have data
only on annual R&D payments, and therefore, I do not observe the exact moment of
program participation. In column (2) the participation rule is changed so that firms,
which have not received payment at t-1 or at t and became program participants
at t+1 belong to the treatment group. Compared to the previous models, this
specification assumes that the first payment is made during the year of approval
decision (assumed to be at moment t). The first stage estimate reduces down to a
third and the participation effect remains insignificant.
It is also possible that R&D programs would have long-term effects on patenting.
Previous R&D program participation may have an effect on long-term innovation,
and patents from previous projects could spill over to later periods, which would
affect the estimated treatment effect. In column (3), the firms are allowed to partic-
ipate the R&D program only once. The IV estimates increase, which would indicate
that among the first participants, the R&D program could have a larger effect on
patenting, but the estimates remain highly insignificant. Several studies (see e.g.
Görg and Strobl, 2006) have highlighted the importance of lagged dependent vari-
ables when analysing patents. I test for this in column (4) by including lagged
dependent variables for two previous periods. The first stage estimate remains very
close to the estimates of the preferred specification in table 5 and the IV estimate re-
mains insignificant. The similar first stage estimates indicate that the patent history
indicator already controls for differences in innovativeness fairly well.
The final four columns apply additional sample restrictions to see if the R&D pro-
gram is expected to have larger effects in some key groups. In section 3.3 the
manufacturing industry and ’business activities’ were shown to account for most of
the Finnish patents. Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates for manufacturing
industry and business activities, respectively. The first stage estimates are close to
two times larger than for the full sample estimates, but the program effect remains
insignificant.
The final two columns divide the sample into two sub-periods. The first stage
estimate and the insignificant IV estimate are both smaller for the period 2000-2002
(with the largest effect in 2003). This indicates that the difference in the probability
to become R&D program participant is more pronounced after the first years of
ERDF program when larger share of aid was allocated. These results are consistent
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with the estimates of Einiö (forthcoming). Einiö finds that the instrument is stronger
during the first years of the program. At first, the results seem contradictory, but
they stem from the fact the Einiö’s estimates are based on the program approval
dates, whereas I rely on payment data. A major share of the R&D financing in
the 2003-2005 sub-period was paid in 2003, which means that a large share of the
program approval decisions would have been made already in 2002, when most of
the ERDF financing was allocated.
I do not find any significant evidence that the R&D program participation would
affect patenting61. The first stage estimates are significant and have the expected
sign throughout the specifications, which provides some support for the instrument.
However, the estimates are very small, and it might be that the instrument simply
does not produce enough exogenous variation to the treatment variable.
6.4 Discussion
The results of section 6 paint a fairly gloomy picture on the effectiveness of Finnish
R&D scheme. Although both the probability and count models supported the effec-
tiveness of the R&D scheme, I cannot rule out the possibility of endogenous treat-
ment. As was discussed in section 5.2 the conditional independence assumption is
likely to be violated, because the public R&D agency selects program participants
partly based on their innovative potential, which I cannot fully control for. When
endogeneity is taken into account, the program effect was found insignificant.
The causal inference applies only for firms that would not have been accepted into the
support program, had they not been located in the region eligible for the highest level
of ERDF aid. The reason is that the amount of paid R&D subsidies varies across
projects, and the binary treatment indicator would therefore have a heterogenous
effect on supported firms. In the presence of heterogenous treatment, 2SLS estimates
correspond to a local average treatment effect (LATE), as was explained in section
5.2. Based on my estimates, I cannot make any inference on the average program
effect, but it is likely that the treatment effect would be even weaker for firms that
would have been approved into the program even in the absence of ERDF funding.
According to the R&D agency’s estimates, 20 percent of the publicly supported
61I also tested the same specifications for prior patentees, but all the estimates turned out insignif-
icant.
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R&D projects reported that the support did not play an important role in achieving
the outcome (Tekes, 2012b), i.e. they would reach the same outcome even in the
absence of the program62.
Even if I assume that the instrument is valid, it should be noted that the gloomy
picture painted by patent statistics may not fully reflect the innovative effects pro-
duced by the R&D program. This thesis concentrates specifically on the produced
patents, and therefore, projects that do not produce any patents are condemned un-
successful. However, it should be noted that innovative outputs are not necessarily
limited to patents. R&D projects may create, for instance, new process innova-
tions, software licenses or improved production methods. In addition, not even all
patentable innovations are patented, because some firms put higher value on secrecy
instead of seeking for patent protection, as discussed in section 2. It is possible that
public subsidies increase the number of implemented R&D projects, as indicated
by the results of Einiö (forthcoming), but that only a share of these R&D projects
succeed in filing a patent application.
It proves out difficult to separate firms that are innovative due to the program, from
firms that are approved to the program because they are innovative. Most of the
characteristics that explain innovation also explain program eligibility, which raises
a concern of simultaneous causality. The risk of simultaneous causality, in addition
to omitted variable bias, should be carefully studied when analysing R&D programs
with estimators based on the conditional independence assumption. For instance, I
do not have information on private R&D expenditures within firms. These expendi-
tures are likely to affect innovation considerably, as well as the treatment decision63.
Although the omitted information about R&D expenditures within firms does not
bias the IV estimates, it can affect the fit of the model. Luckily, the new tax
regulations from 2013 onwards allow firms to make tax deductions on their R&D
expenditures64, which will for the first time provide extensive administrative data
on R&D expenditures for all Finnish firms. The database created for this thesis
could be easily appended with the new tax data on firm-level R&D expenditures.
The appended data could help to complement the results of this thesis by using in-
formation throughout the innovation process, which would allow for more inclusive
62This figure is also likely to be underestimated, since firms may fear losing future support if the
financing is not found significant for the success (Einiö, forthcoming).
63Access to finance is one of Tekes’ selection criterium.
64http://www.vero.fi (accessed 8 June 2013)
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separation of innovative inputs and outputs.
Finally, it must be mentioned that it is possible that the lack of evidence is com-
pletely due to a weak instrument. First stage estimates were found significant for
several specifications, and section 3.2 also provided some evidence that the instru-
ment is likely to produce considerable variation. Einiö (forthcoming) also presented
some convincing evidence in support of the instrument, but it is possible that in my
setup the instrument validity would suffer from patents leaking from the executing
offices to headquarters, as discussed above. This would reduce the variation that the
instrument induces to the outcome through the treatment variable. The problem
could be avoided in future research by utilising the inventor information included
in the constructed dataset. For instance, inventor names65 could be matched to
tax registries include worker level information on salaries paid within firms. The
matching would allow one to locate the office where the R&D process for the patent
was actually conducted in. It would also be interesting to see in future research how
the results would change if the patents would be weighted by patent citations. Ci-
tation weighted patents could be used to create a continuous dependent variable of
patenting, which could prove useful considering the relatively low patenting volumes
in Finland.
7 Conclusions
Public R&D programs aim to foster innovation by supporting privately conducted
R&D projects. This thesis complements the existing empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of public R&D subsidy programs in fostering innovation outputs. The
question has not been carefully examined in the context of Finland, and the coverage
of the data used in this thesis is also somewhat exceptional even in the global context.
I provide an extensive administrative dataset for drawing detailed information on
firm-level innovation in Finland, and employed it to analyse the causal effect of the
Finnish R&D subsidy scheme on patenting.
I argued that the analysis on the effectiveness of R&D programs should put consider-
65Firms usually report the firm name under the applicant name, whereas the inventor name is com-
monly reserved for crediting the actual inventor (private person) of the patent. See Appendix
1 for information on how the matching procedure can be implementing in practice.
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able weight on accounting for the program selection bias. R&D program participants
are selected partly based on a firm’s innovative potential, but the information is un-
likely to be sufficiently observed by a researcher. Therefore, simple regression models
and matching estimators that rely on the conditional independence assumption are
likely to produce misleading results of the program’s causal effect.
I accounted for the omitted variable bias by employing instrumental variable (IV)
methods based on exogenous regional variation in the allocation of public R&D
funding, which originates from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
aid regulations.
When possible program selection bias is neglected, the R&D support program is
associated with an increase of some 8 to 11 percentage point in the probability
to file a patent application during the five years following the program approval
decision among the active patentees. The increase among all firms is only around
0.1 percentage points.
I found evidence that the probability to receive public R&D support is significantly
higher in sparsely populated regions, which are eligible for the highest level of ERDF
aid. Nevertheless, the IV estimates do not provide any significant support for the
causal effect of the R&D program on patenting propensity. However, the estimates
apply only for firms whose participation status is defined by the instrument, and
therefore, I cannot rule out the possibility that the R&D program would foster
innovation within firms not affected by the instrument. In addition, I acknowledge
that the lack of evidence might result from the weakness of the instrument.
The innovative firms are found to be very similar to firms preferred by the public
R&D agency, which could indicate that some of the supported firms might have had
conducted their R&D projects even in the absence of public support. Therefore, it
is essential that the R&D program selection criteria is publicly scrutinised in order
to ensure that public R&D funding is allocated only for the projects dependent on
it.
This thesis has laid some basis for analysing the Finnish R&D support program in
the light of innovation outputs. I believe that the extensive work undertaken for
building the firm-level patent database will be of significance for future research
on Finnish innovation. The database can be used in further research to explore the
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elements essential for the innovative process in order to accelerate Finnish innovation
I have discussed the limitations of patent data and provided some suggestions on
how to overcome them in the future. Additional research is required on innovation
outputs in Finland in order to develop more effective innovation policies and increase
the general understanding of the innovation process itself.
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Appendix: Database linking process
PATSTAT database structure is essentially designed for EPO’s own use, especially
for analysing application data with less emphasis on who has made the application.
This somewhat complicates the firm-level patent analysis because the database does
not provide firm identification codes equivalent to e.g. Finnish Business ID system
(y-tunnus). Therefore, a researcher has to use time-consuming and error-prone string
matching methods to link patents to individual firms. After the initial link has been
established, practically every Finnish company databases can be directly linked to
EPO’s patent statistics. Here, I will provide detailed information on the matching
process used in this study.
PATSTAT provides applicant names and its own numerical identification code for
these names. Due to numerous misspellings, the names require considerable har-
monisation. To ease the problem, PATSTAT has created a variable for harmonised
names, which removes the simplest typos. An initial link between patent statis-
tics and Finnish companies is established between Patstat and Yrtti. Since I am
only interested in matching patent applications to firms, I searched for government
agencies and individual inventors to exclude them from the sample. Names were
matched in the following manner: First, names were first standardized: Non-ASCII
characters, symbols, corporative abbreviations and spaces were removed. In ad-
dition, all the names were transformed to uppercase letters. Second, since I’m
interested on private R&D, I searched for universities and research institutes with
several terms (such as SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY,YLIOPISTO, INSTITUTE etc.)
and removed the correctly tagged observations. Third, I used an algorithm66, which
first searched for the 1000 most common Finnish forenames and reported the cor-
responding surnames. Then the corresponding surnames where used to search for
additional forenames associated with them, and the iterative loop was continued
until to a preset criterium. The applicants that were picked out by the algorithm
were manually checked and deleted if they were private persons67. Fourth, after the
standardisation, exact strings were matched. However, although Patstat and Yrtti
both contain unique firm identifiers, several cases occurred where firms with iden-
tical names had different identifiers. In these cases, all the equivocal applications
66The algorithm can be requested from the author.
67The algorithm was surprisingly effective in finding private persons and had a modest error
marginal of only around four per cent.
Appendix: Database linking process 65
were randomly assigned to one of the corresponding firms to avert selection bias.
Fifth, a phonetic algorithm was used to match names that contained simple typos.
All the matches based on phonetic matching algorithm were later checked manually
and miss-matches were corrected. Finally, the remaining firms were revised and
matched manually when possible.
In total, out of 8831 firms in the patent database, I was able to match 4465 firms
and 20 536 patents to YRTTI. It should be also mentioned that the non-matched
firms included many peculiar names (e.g. single letter names or no reported name),
which makes it difficult to assess the real number of non-matched ’relevant’ firms.
